Commentaires
German small caps amid persistent pessimism
26 septembre 2024
The Germans’ reputation for their persistent pessimismus (pessimism in German) is not anything new. Going back as far as the 19th century when the pessimismusstreit (pessimism controversy) was all the rage among German philosophers such as Taubert and Nietzsche. There is a case to be made however that Germany’s woes in the last couple years, especially since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, are deserving of such emotions. From being dubbed the sick man of Europe in the 90s after the reunification, to being its industrials crown jewel just 15 years ago (even outpacing US growth at various points), it is now again the poster child of the variety of issues that are causing Europe to lag behind its global peers.
Let’s go through the list:
- Internal politics:
While France often takes the spotlight for its chaotic politics in Europe, Germany have its own brand of messy fiscally conservative politics. Well-renowned for their high aversion to fiscal deficit, Germany’s government amended its constitution in 2009 to include a debt brake (Schuldenbremse) which limits annual structural deficit to 0.35% of GDP. Although that rule was suspended during COVID and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is now back in place and spending cuts must be agreed on to get back to target. Consequently, Germans have been falling behind in allocating funds to meet climate transition targets along with making many necessary investments in infrastructure and new, growth- focused sectors. Furthermore the low government approval rating and weak economic environment has led to a resurgence of the far-right party “Alternative For Germany”. The far-right party won its first parliamentary seat in the most recent regional elections, the first time a far-right party is represented in parliament since WWII. EU elections earlier this Spring also saw a far-right resurgence from German voters, as dissatisfaction with the political and economic environment becomes more pronounced. We find it unlikely that the current divided politics will lead to any meaningful breakthrough in spending in the short term. - Dependence on the Chinese economy:
Of all large Western economies, Germany remains the most exposed to China. Between 2011 and 2022, growth in German exports toward China grew at a CAGR of over 4%, peaking at €107 billion and representing more than 3% of 2022 GDP. This collapsed in 2023 with the Chinese economy reopening after COVID lockdowns, as its consumers spending deteriorated meaningfully. As such, 2023 exports to China were down just short of €10 billion to €97 billion and unlikely to reach new highs anytime soon. Furthermore, the largest export to China, German-made cars, is under considerable threat from Chinese carmakers that are far ahead on EV development and selling at large discounts to European cars, implying large market share losses from German carmakers. When we factor in supply chains moving out of China and reshoring, we do not expect that China exports will contribute to Germany’s growth anytime soon. - Energy costs:
Germany uses twice as much energy in its industrial sector as the next-biggest country in Europe. It was one of the primary beneficiaries of cheap Russian gas exports before the Ukraine invasion that increased natural gas prices tenfold in 2022, before settling back down to more reasonable levels. Nonetheless the more energy-intensive nature of German industrials and chemicals now makes German producers uncompetitive on the global stage thanks to a higher-cost structure. There also does not seem to be a strong willingness to change its mind on turning away from nuclear energy, with insufficient investment in the energy grid. Firms like BASF and ThyssenKrupp have gone through significant restructuring of their German operations in the last 2 years, with a focus on relocating some plants to lower cost areas. - Cautious consumers:
A 6% unemployment rate has been gradually increasing but remains in line with the average of the last 20 years in Germany. Income is rising faster than prices and rates are coming down. So why the pessimism? Germany was one of the few economies contracting in Europe in 2023, and 2024 has not inspired much optimism so far with many pundits projecting stagnation or another slight downturn in the country. Further negative messaging on adverse demographics and underexposure to secular growth themes for the next decade (climate transition, AI, service economy, etc.) have led investor sentiment to reach new lows.
An important question mark remains around how much of this is weakness is structural and how much can be addressed in the shorter term. Consumer sentiment can shift quickly and the balance sheet of German consumers remain solid. However, no level of internal demand growth will compensate for the weakness from China, which is not expected to improvement anytime soon. There are also questions around whether that demand will be redirected toward Chinese companies as reshoring becomes an ever increasingly important geopolitical topic. When Germany was last facing such structural issues in the 90s, it showed a willingness to cut through red tape and embark on painful but necessary reforms, leading to over a decade of outperformance. We have yet to see signs from current leaders that they are willing to repeat this process.
Despite the all the gloominess, we still see pockets of opportunity within German small caps, although we remain highly selective. The downward trajectory of rates, undemanding relative valuation to large caps and declining energy costs are all positives for small caps which represent 14% of its overall equity market. We continue to prefer names with globally diversified exposure and/or a secular theme that will support growth over multiple years. Here are two examples:
Earlier this year we initiated a position in RENK Group AG, a global leader in mission-critical propulsion and drive technology components for the defense industry and a solid example of German industrial and engineering prowess. Founded in 1873, the company was spun off from a Volkswagen division and acquired by private equity. It is globally diversified as a primary provider to most NATO militaries, which are under more pressure to increase their spending to 2% of GDP. RENK is already present in 75% of tracked military vehicles (excluding China and Russia) and 33% of large surface vessels, with an average content per tracked vehicle around 15%, providing plenty of opportunities to increase its share of sales from higher-margin aftermarket content. Given the strong barriers to entry as a NATO supplier, its backlog extending to 2028 and its strong brand reputation, we find RENK to be one of the best quality names Germany has to offer.
We are also shareholders in Aurubis AG, the largest copper smelter and refiner in Europe, with a market share of over 40% in the region and a growing presence in the US. It sources copper and various other metals both from miners directly and from industrial and scrapyard waste. Copper as a commodity is set to see continued high growth in demand over the next decade given its uses across virtually all industrial segments and its central role in the renewable energy landscape. Copper can also be infinitely recycled, so being the first mover and having existing infrastructure provides a tremendous advantage to Aurubis. The materials sector – more specifically the mining industry – is often seen as a sustainability laggard, but Aurubis distinguishes itself nicely as a unique recycling play with multiple growth levers.
Most data points toward Germany facing continued headwinds. Nonetheless, we seek to retain exposure to the second-largest economy in Europe and we believe names such as RENK Group and Aurubis are the right fits for the job.